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State Bd. of Parole Comm’rs v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 53 (Oct. 24,
2019) (en banc)1
WRITS OF MANDAMUS FOR SENTENCE MODIFICATION: APPLYING THE CORRECT
VERSION OF N.R.S. § 176.033(2)
Summary
The Court confronted several issues in this methodical decision. The Court addressed
standing and discretionary review in the context of writ petitions. It next analyzes and determines
the applicable version of a particular NRS section. Finally, the Court interprets the applicable
version of the statute. The opinion culminates in the granting of a writ of mandamus petition for
the Parole Board to correct an inaccurate application of law at the district court level.
Facts and Procedural History
In 1979, Marlin Thompson received two sentences: a life sentence for a first-degree murder
conviction and a fifteen-year sentence for attempted murder. He was released on parole in 1992.
In 2017, the Parole Board filed a petition to decrease Thompson’s sentence. Washoe County
opposed this petition because the statute they asserted was applicable provided the minimum
sentence for first-degree murder was a life term. The district court denied the petition; the Parole
Board appealed and petitioned for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction; this opinion addresses the writ of mandamus petition.
Discussion
The Parole Board Has Standing
Before reaching the merits of the writ petition, the respondents argue that the Board lacks
standing because it has no “beneficial interest in the relief sought.” A beneficial interest, defined
as “a direct and substantial interest that falls within the zone of interests to be protected by the
legal duty asserted,” is required to obtain standing for a mandamus petition.2 The Court found that
the Parole Board did have a beneficial interest because it has an interest in the extent to which their
statutory ability to petition courts for sentence adjustments exists.3
The Parole Board has no other adequate remedy and has presented a question of law that warrants
this court’s consideration.
With standing resolved, the Court next moved to the issues of whether a writ of mandamus
was an appropriate remedy and whether the Court should exercise its discretion in this case. The
general rule precludes writ relief when there is a “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy . . . .” In this
case, the Parole Board argued that writ relief was the only relief available. Respondents argued
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that the Parole Board could obtain alternate relief by seeking commutation of Thompson’s
sentence through the Board of Pardons Commissioners. The Court was not convinced that a request
for such “an act of extraordinary grace” from the Board of Pardons was a legitimate alternative
and found the Parole Board’s argument persuasive.
The final preliminary issue was whether the Court should exercise the “purely
discretionary” power it possesses in the writ of mandamus context.4 The Court elected to consider
the writ in this case because it involved “a pure question of law that is of statewide significance.”
The version of NRS § 176.033(2) in effect when the Parole Board filed its petition applies.
The Court’s first legal question was to determine the applicable version of NRS
§ 176.033(2). Respondent argues that the 1978 version applies because it was in effect at the time
of Thompson’s offense; however, the Parole Board argues the 1987 version is effective. The 1978
language required that a parolee serve “one-half of the period of his parole” before the Parole
Board could reduce his sentence. This language created a problem because of the impossibility
associated with determining “one-half” of a life sentence. The 1987 version addressed this issue
and permitted a decrease in sentence after one-half or ten consecutive years of a sentence had been
served. The Court, addressing respondent’s argument, noted that the plain language of the 1987
amendments were not limited to a parolee’s offense date.
The Supreme Court also made clear that either version of the statute becomes relevant upon
a “triggering event”: a specified portion of a sentence served. Additionally, both versions permit
the Parole Board to petition the district court “at any time after” the triggering event. Due to this
language, and because the date of the offense was not made relevant, the Court elected to apply
the 1987 version of the statute because it contained the relevant and effective language at the time
the Parole Board petitioned for a sentence modification.5
Life sentences may be modified pursuant to NRS 176.033(2) (1987) to a sentence not less than the
minimum parole eligibility prescribed by the applicable penal statute.
The Court next reviewed, de novo, the statutory interpretation, “even in the context of a
writ petition.”6 The respondents argue the sentence cannot be reduced because the applicable
statute contained no minimum sentence; however, the Court found this argument without merit
because it could permit a scenario in which the Parole Board correctly petitions a Court that would
have no ability to grant the petition. This scenario would render the ability to petition “nugatory.”
The Court, referencing legislative history, identified the purpose of these amendments was
to enable the Parole Board’s petition for modification of a life sentence. The Court concluded that
a sentence of life with a minimum service requirement before parole eligibility may be decreased
to “not less than the period specified for parole eligibility.” Additionally, the Parole Board may
petition “only after the parolee has served 10 consecutive years on parole.”
The Court acknowledged that the above conditions were satisfied in this case, and the
district court has the ability to reduce Thompson’s sentence. Because the lower court misapplied
the law, the Court granted the writ of mandamus petition and remanded.
State Dep’t of Transp. v. Thompson, 99 Nev. 358, 361, 662 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1983).
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